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T
 he past two decades have seen a great rise in the patent- 
 ing of e-commerce inventions. Now, those same pat- 
 ents are taking an equally great fall. In a series of four 
recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted the doctrine of 
patent eligibility and, in the process, raised the bar for e-commerce 
and software patents—making it more dificult to obtain and 
enforce those types of patents. Although there is no afirmative bar 
against patenting these business-focused inventions, the expanded 
“abstract idea” approach creates signiicant hurdles. Pointedly, if 
reviewed under the new doctrine, we expect that several hundred 
thousand already-issued patent claims would be found lacking 
patentable subject matter. Because the Supreme Court eligibil-
ity decisions are applied retroactively to already-issued patents, 
the result is that these patents have been implicitly rendered unen-
forceable. And, in many cases, we would expect that attempts at 
enforcement would lead to sanctions or an award of attorneys’ 
fees.1 This loss of entitlement represents a signiicant inancial 
loss for the patent holders. However, Ronald Coase’s work should 
remind us that the change creates new value and new entitlements 
for those who would use the ideas previously restricted by patent 
rights.2 Looking forward, the patent ofice and courts are strug-
gling to apply the new doctrine in a principled manner, while 
innovators and operating companies are shifting business plans to 
better take advantage of the new regime.
Some History of Patent Eligibility
Patent rights have deep roots in U.S. history. The U.S. Con-
stitution empowers Congress to offer inventors “exclusive 
Right” to their “Discoveries.”3 Although written well before the 
advent of law and economics, this patent and copyright clause 
is expressly designed as an incentive structure “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” After enactment of the 
irst Patent Act in 1793,4 Thomas Jefferson took the charge 
as the initial patent examiner.5 Elements of the 1793 Act have 
remained virtually unchanged over the law’s 220-year reign; 
this includes the statutory statement of patent eligibility that is 
now found in § 101 of Title 35: “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”6 Section 101 is written broadly and 
positively and without any express exceptions indicating what 
is not patentable. The Supreme Court has illed that gap by bar-
ring the patenting of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.”7 Those nonstatutory exceptions are, according 
to the court, “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”8
Contemporary history of these exceptions goes back to 
Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
irst two cases—Benson9 and Flook10—both restricted pat-
ent eligibility in important ways. Benson held that a process 
using electronic “shift registers” to algorithmically convert 
numbers from binary-coded decimal to pure binary format 
was ineligible because the mathematical formula used is an 
abstract idea and—because the process was only practically 
useful in a digital computer—the claimed process was seen as 
“wholly pre-empt[ing] the mathematical formula and in prac-
tical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”11 Flook 
also involved a mathematical algorithm—but this time it was 
applied to the very particular problem of setting an alarm limit 
in a catalytic converter process. As such, there was no question 
of broad preemption. Still, the Supreme Court found the pat-
ent to be ineligible because the unpatentable algorithm was the 
only novel feature of the invention. The Court wrote:
[T]he discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent 
unless there is some other inventive concept in its applica-
tion. . . . A competent draftsman could attach some form of 
post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the 
Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or par-
tially patentable, because a patent application contained a inal 
step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully 
applied to existing surveying techniques.12
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a pair of deci-
sions that have served as counterpoints to the narrowing focus of 
Flook and Benson. In Diehr,13 the Court held that a process for 
molding and curing rubber was patent eligible even though the 
process was based around use of the Arrhenius equation. Although 
the Court maintained that the equation alone is an abstract idea, 
the claimed process was patent eligible because it represented a 
practical implementation involving “transforming or reducing an 
article to a different state or thing.”14 In Chakrabarty,15 the Court 
held that a genetically modiied bacterium was patent eligible. The 
decision famously found congressional intent that patent eligibility 
includes “anything under the sun that is made by man.”16
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was formed 
by Congress soon after Diehr and Chakrabarty and took on 
its appointed role of solidifying and unifying patent law.17 In 
that process, the appellate “patent court” latched onto the two 
more recent and more expansive Supreme Court cases while 
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largely ignoring Benson and Flook.18 Through that process, 
the court began allowing the patenting of a wider scope and 
variety of software and business methods relating to e-com-
merce. That approach reached its expanse with the 1998 
Federal Circuit opinion in State Street Bank holding that a 
data processing system for implementing a particular invest-
ment portfolio strategy was patent eligible.19 That decision 
also found that business methods are patent eligible:
We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception 
to rest. Since its inception, the “business method” exception 
has merely represented the application of some general, but 
no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out of the 
“requirement for invention”—which was eliminated by § 103. 
Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and 
should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for 
patentability as applied to any other process or method.20
In the follow-on case of AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communica-
tions, the Federal Circuit took its broad eligibility position a step 
further and essentially wrote off the abstract idea test: “the judi-
cially-deined proscription against patenting of a ‘mathematical 
algorithm,’ to the extent such a proscription still exists, is nar-
rowly limited to mathematical algorithms in the abstract.”21 With 
an expanded eligibility doctrine and explosion of online business 
activity, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Ofice began issuing 
e-commerce and Internet software related patents in droves—a 
process that continued largely unabated for the next decade.
The Newest Quartet of Supreme Court Cases
After a 30-year hiatus, the Supreme Court has again focused its 
attention on subject matter eligibility with what has turned into 
a second four-part series (with ongoing potential for expan-
sion). The irst of this revival quartet was the 2010 decision in 
Bilski v. Kappos.22 Bilski involved a classic business method 
patent application, claiming the hedging of risk in a commodity 
market that basically operates by initiating a set of transac-
tions with consumers (based on the consumer’s risk position) 
and another set of transactions with market participants who 
have risk positions counter to the consumers.23 Although the 
claims do not expressly require the use of software or comput-
ers, many of them—especially those requiring Monte Carlo 
simulations—would require such technology in practice. In 
reviewing the claimed invention, the Supreme Court found that 
Bilski’s method was an abstract idea and therefore not patent 
eligible. To reach this conclusion, the Court irst hit the “reset” 
button by rejecting the whole of Federal Circuit doctrine on 
the topic of patentable subject matter. The Court explained that 
“nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing inter-
pretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has used in the past.”24 At the same time, the Court also 
rejected calls to create a bright-line ban on e-commerce pat-
ents. Instead, the court simply pointed to the aforementioned 
cases of Benson, Flook, and Diehr as controlling without fur-
ther substantive analysis. Four justices refused to join the 
majority but instead concurred in judgment—arguing latly that 
“business methods are not patentable.”25
The 2012 decision of Mayo v. Prometheus26 did not relate to 
e-commerce or software inventions directly, but is important for 
the way that it set up the most recent e-commerce decision of 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.27 In Mayo, the patent at issue related to a 
personalized method of iterative drug dosing that required the rais-
ing or lowering of the dosage of a particular drug (thiopurine) in 
order to reach a known threshold blood level of a speciied metab-
olite of the drug. In reaching its conclusion that the patent was 
improperly directed to a law of nature, the Supreme Court irst 
categorized the correlation between metabolite blood level and 
an overdose or underdose of thiopurine as an unpatentable law of 
nature. As the second step in the analysis, the Court considered 
the additional limitations in the claims but found them insufi-
cient to transform the identiied natural law into a patent eligible 
process. The opinion repeatedly and favorably cites the had-been 
black-sheep Flook case in inding that the physical and transfor-
mative elements of the invention were simply postsolution activity 
and patent attorney tricks.28 As to the claimed practical application 
steps, the Mayo Court found it relevant and important that those 
additional steps were already known in the art and thus lacking the 
innovative weight necessary for patent eligibility.
The third member of the new quartet is the Myriad Genet-
ics case.29 That case focused on Myriad’s discovery of the 
BRCA gene mutations that predict a high likelihood of early 
onset breast or cervical cancer in women. In deciding pat-
ent eligibility, the Supreme Court held that Myriad’s patented 
claims to an “isolated” form of the BRCA gene were ineligi-
ble as a product of nature but that a lab-created cDNA version 
of the naturally occurring mutant gene was eligible. The 
difference, according to the court, was that creation of the 
cDNA involved a substantial molecular transformation while 
mere isolation of naturally occurring DNA did not. Of course, 
the physical transformation that was suficient here is ordi-
narily lacking in e-commerce inventions.
The inal case in the recent quartet is Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank.30 In Alice, the court took another important step in hold-
ing that the two-step approach to patent eligibility applied to 
laws of nature in Mayo applies to the abstract idea analysis as 
well. Thus, under Alice, the eligibility test begins with a ques-
tion of whether the patent claim encompasses an abstract idea 
and, if so, then asks whether the invention includes an “inventive 
concept” suficient to “transform” that abstract idea into a pat-
entable invention.31 In Alice, the Supreme Court particularly held 
that transformation is not satisied by the mere recitation of stan-
dard computer limitations or other limitations written at a “high 
level of generality.”32 The patent at issue in Alice claimed a com-
puter-implemented system for managing settlement risk by using 
a third-party intermediary. In rejecting the patent eligibility, the 
Court held that the claimed invention was directed to the abstract 
idea of intermediated settlement and that the computer-related 
elements were claimed at such a high level of generality as to be 
insuficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible 
invention. Although Alice is still relatively new, dozens of soft-
ware and business method patents have already been held invalid 
based on its new precedential force.
E-Commerce Patents
One way to think through the impact of the new eligibility doc-
trine is to look back on some well-known e-commerce related 
patents and ask whether those patents would still be consid-
ered patent eligible. Here, we walk through four examples: the 
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inancial services data processing patent from the Federal Circuit’s 
1998 State Street Bank decision, Amazon’s “one-click” patent, 
Google’s PageRank algorithm, and Apple’s primary patent cover-
ing its “slide-to-unlock” feature. Although all four were previously 
judged patent eligible, our analysis is that only one remains viable.
Data Processing in State Street Bank
In the early 1990s, Signature Financial obtained a patent covering 
a data processing system for a “hub and spoke” inancial services 
coniguration.33 This system manages the low of data, and makes 
the calculations necessary to run a partnership portfolio hold-
ing a set of partnership funds (the hub and spokes respectively). 
The particular approach and structure were designed to reduce 
potential capital gains tax for the portfolio as a whole. Although 
not claimed as a method per se, this patent has been repeatedly 
pointed to as a classic business method patent.
In its 1998 decision, the Federal Circuit found the patent 
eligible for protection.34 In our hypothetical analysis here, we sug-
gest that the patent no longer passes muster. The irst question 
under Alice is whether the patent is directed to an abstract idea. 
Although the particular deinition of an abstract idea is not well 
expounded, it is fairly easy to characterize the general notion of 
structuring a partnership portfolio in a hub-and-spokes mechanism 
for tax avoidance as an abstract idea. The tax avoidance struc-
ture has much in common with the escrow approach in Alice and 
the risk-hedging scheme in Bilski—all of which are essentially 
“fundamental economic principles” that cannot be patented. The 
particular computer limitations in the Signature Financial patent 
require a “processor,” “data storage,” and a way to calculate proits 
and losses in the various portions of the system. As in Alice, those 
limitations are all claimed at a very high level of generality with 
nothing inventive added within those application steps. As such, 
they would not be suficient to transform the unpatentable abstract 
idea into a patent eligible invention.
Verdict: unpatentable.
Amazon’s One-Click
Amazon’s one-click patent has repeatedly been a point of dis-
cussion since its issuance in 1999.35 As the name suggests, 
the patent covers a method and system for placing an order 
over the Internet using just one “click” of a mouse (a “single 
action”). Then in response to the single action, a user’s com-
puter submits a purchase order and a server system brings 
in stored information about the user (such as payment and 
address information) and begins the fulillment process.36
The abstract idea being claimed here is simply that of making 
an order by using a single action. As in the prior cases discussed, 
this is an old and common approach in business for an estab-
lished customer to simply call and order where the customer 
already has a payment method on ile and the prices are already 
known or negotiated. Amazon’s patent does require user and 
server computers, but those were all well known at the time of 
Amazon’s invention and are claimed at a high level of generality.
Verdict: unpatentable.
Google’s PageRank
A major aspect of Google’s early search engine success was 
its patented PageRank algorithm.37 The general idea was that 
important search information about a page could be derived 
based on what others are saying about that page. Using that 
principle, the patent claims an iterative method of ranking a 
irst document (such as a web page) based on the rank of a set 
of other documents linking back to the irst document.
After the decision in Alice, it is dificult to see how this patent 
is still valid. In several cases, the Supreme Court has stated that 
mathematical algorithms are unpatentable abstract ideas. Here, 
the Google patent is directed toward a ranking algorithm that 
is, according to the deinition, an abstract idea. Further, the gen-
eral idea of ranking importance of a work according to its back 
citations is also well known in academia. The claim is “com-
puter implemented” but there are no innovative concepts that 
rely on that implementation, and the claim only calculates a rank 
rather than making any transformation. Thus, there are no addi-
tional elements that would transform the abstract algorithm into 
a patentable invention. As Alice held, “simply implementing a 
mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a com-
puter, is not a patentable application of that principle.”38
Verdict: unpatentable.
Apple’s Slide-to-Unlock
The inal patent that we analyze here can only loosely it 
within the e-commerce category. The slide-to-unlock feature 
is a well-known aspect of contemporary handheld devices 
such as Apple’s iPhone. Apple’s patent covers a device with 
a touch screen that can be unlocked via gestures performed 
on the touch screen.39 The basic idea is that the device is 
unlocked if contact with the display corresponds to a pre-
deined gesture for unlocking the device that includes moving 
an unlock image across a touch screen display. The slide-
to-unlock patent is one of the several patents that Apple has 
successfully asserted against Samsung in recent years.
This case is more dificult to it within the Alice model. Cer-
tainly, the general idea of a sliding lock is well known and—at 
least at that level of generality—could be considered an abstract 
idea. However, Apple’s implementation offers signiicantly 
more because it is designed to solve a problem speciic to touch-
sensitive displays. Further, the approach offers a particular 
technological solution involving the tracking of a “continuous” 
movement on the touch display, linking that to a corresponding 
interactive graphical image, and comparing the movement with 
a predeined unlock pattern or location set. Thus, this particular 
application appears to provide the “something more” required 
by Alice, although that term has not been well deined. A court 
may question, for instance, whether touch screens were already 
so well known by Apple’s 2005 patent application date that they 
should be seen as equivalent to general purpose computers.
Verdict: patent eligible.
Conclusion
In the e-commerce realm, the bottom line is that a high per-
centage of patents issued over the past two decades have been 
implicitly rendered invalid by the recent quartet of Supreme 
Court subject matter eligibility cases. While parties will still 
battle over threshold tests of the meaning of “abstract idea” 
and “innovative concept,” there is no question that the bar has 
been signiicantly raised. Going forward, we expect business 
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innovators to forgo patent protection unless their new idea 
comes with a strong technological innovation. n
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